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This paper characterizes optimal policies in the presence of tax evasion and undocu-
mented workers. Equilibrium can be characterized as segmented or non-segmented,
depending on whether domestic workers work exclusively in the formal sector (seg-
mented) or also in the informal sector (non-segmented). Surprisingly, in equilibrium,
wages are always equalized between domestic and undocumented workers, even if they
do not work in the same sectors of the economy. This is driven by the interaction of
¯rm level decisions with optimal government policy. We also ¯nd that enforcement
may not always be decreasing in its cost, and that governments will optimally enforce
segmentation if enforcement costs are not too high.
Key Words: Informal Labour Market; Enforcement; Undocumented Workers; Pub-
lic Good Provision
JEL: H32, H26, K421 Introduction
The informal economy a®ects not only the size and scale of productive output, but
also optimal government policy. This sector arises for a variety of reasons: perhaps
primarily, as a source of employment for undocumented workers and as a method of
evading taxes for employers. These two motivations have been studied independently;
in this paper, we look at them jointly and ¯nd that illegal immigration has a large
impact on the nature of optimal tax and enforcement policy, and interacts with stan-
dard tax evasion incentives, playing an important role not only in the determination
of equilibrium wages, but also in the organization of production across the formal and
informal sectors.
In developed countries, illegal immigration, tax evasion, and the informal economy
are of su±cient importance to impact on the performance of the economy. Even con-
servative estimates suggest these phenomena are large and economically signi¯cant.
According to a report of the Pew Hispanic Center, the number of illegal immigrants
living in the United States was 11.9 million in March 2008, of which 8.3 million par-
ticipated in the U.S. labor force (Passel and Cohn, 2009). These numbers imply that
unauthorized immigrants are 4% of the U.S. population and no less than 5.4% of its
workforce. Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in Canada by police and
immigration personnel range between 50,000 and 200,000 according to the Canadian
Encyclopedia.1 Given estimates of this size, it is not surprising that immigration
policy is the focus of much public debate. Tax evasion by individuals is also an im-
portant phenomenon.2 For example, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) report that in the
United States, according to the Internal Revenue Service, 17% of personal income tax
liabilities were simply not paid in 1992. Finally, while measuring the size of the infor-
mal sector is notoriously di±cult, Schneider and Enste (2000) provide estimates for
a large number of countries. According to their estimates for the early nineties, the
smallest informal sectors (8-10% of the economy) were in Austria, Switzerland, and
the United States. At the other extreme were some developing countries where the
informal sector represented 68-76% of the economy (e.g. Egypt, Nigeria, Thailand,
Tunisia). As for Canada, its informal sector ranges between 10-13.5% of its economy.
The theoretical literature on each of the above phenomena is large but somewhat
segmented in that it tends to address each of them separately. For example, the tax
1See the article on Immigration Policy at www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com.
2The evidence of tax evasion by ¯rms is very limited.
1evasion literature is not really concerned with the informal sector or illegal immi-
gration. Initiated by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and surveyed by Slemrod and
Yitzhaki (2002), the tax evasion literature mainly focuses on the decision by individ-
uals, otherwise perfectly honest, to conceal a portion of their income from the tax
authorities. Following Reinganum and Wilde (1985), an important secondary strand
of that literature characterizes the optimal auditing policies of a tax authority facing
individuals behaving µ a la Allingham and Sandmo (1972). As for the literature on
illegal immigration, Ethier (1986) initiated it by studying the impact of illegal im-
migration on the host country, while Bond and Chen (1987) enriched Ethier's model
by adding a second country and capital mobility to examine the welfare e®ects of
¯rm level enforcement. It is probably fair to say that a signi¯cant portion of the
literature that followed these papers focuses on the impact of illegal immigrants on
the well-being of domestic workers,3 and that tax evasion was not a primary issue
of concern for those working in this area. Finally, there is a theoretical literature
on the informal sector. For example, Rauch (1991), Fortin et al. (1997), Fugazza
and Jacques (2003), and de Paula and Scheinkman (2007), all model the choice of
entrepreneurs to operate in the legal or the informal sector, based on factors like scale
economies, wage regulations and taxes. However, this literature is not concerned with
the presence of illegal immigrants despite the fact that by their very presence, they
may a®ect this choice.
Few models have integrated the above three phenomena despite the fact that there
are obvious connections between them, and no paper that we are aware of has looked
at optimal policy in this context. The presence of undocumented workers reduces
the cost to ¯rms of entering the informal sector, relative wages a®ect the incentives
of documented or domestic workers to work in either sector, and the willingness of
¯rms to move into the informal sector reduces the capacity of the state to raise tax
revenue and fund public goods. In this paper, we allow for all of these channels.
The starkest result that we ¯nd is that wages are always equalized across the formal
and informal sectors (except of course in the presence of a binding minimum wage
in the formal sector). This is even the case when the labour market equilibrium is
characterized as being segmented, where domestic workers only work in the formal
sector and undocumented workers work in the informal sector.4 This is due to the
3To date, there is no consensus on the empirical impact of immigration (legal/illegal) on the
native population (employment, wages). See Borjas (1999) and Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008).
4Djajic (1997) has a related model and considers a segmented equilibrium, but in that model,
wages of the two sectors are disconnected in a segmented equilibrium.
2fact that in a segmented equilibrium wages are determined by the combination of ¯rm
decisions and optimal policy. For this reason, in our model, domestic workers always
prefer to have fewer undocumented workers. However, total welfare is increasing in
the number of undocumented workers. We ¯nd that the public good is under-provided
relative to the ¯rst best, since enforcement is costly and thereby distorts public good
provision.
Enforcement and taxes interact in somewhat subtle ways. For example, in contrast
to standard ¯ndings in the literatures on crime and tax evasion,5 optimal enforcement
may not be always be decreasing in its cost. In a segmented equilibrium, optimal en-
forcement and taxes are complementary policies and since enforcement is costly in
terms of the public good, when the marginal value of the public good is high, in-
creasing the cost of the enforcement may actually lead the government to want to
increase enforcement to maintain public good provision. When the marginal bene¯t
is small, increasing the cost of enforcement leads to a reduction in optimal enforce-
ment. We also ¯nd that increasing the number of undocumented workers increases
the cost of public good provision. This is because more undocumented workers reduce
informal wages, making it more di±cult to raise tax revenue in the legal sector. As
a consequence, if society places insu±cient weight on these undocumented workers'
consumption of the public good, optimal public good provision will fall as the total
population increases.
In a non-segmented equilibrium when domestic workers choose to work in both
the formal and informal sectors, the size of the formal sector is decreasing in the
number of informal workers. Although, market segmentation maximizes the size of
the tax base, if the cost of enforcement is too high, it will not be socially optimal to
ensure all domestic workers stay in the legal sector. For these cost ranges, optimal
policies will enforce a non-segmented equilibrium.
We extend our base model in several important ways. We consider what happens
when the number of undocumented workers or the level of illegal immigration is
endogenous. We ¯nd similar results, but also an additional interesting feature, the
government can use the level of public provision directly as a way of altering the
number of illegal migrants and as a lever on the illegal wage. This is due to the fact
that the migration decision results from comparing source country utility with the
destination country utility. Increasing the public good provided makes a destination
country more attractive, which encourages migration. The arbitrage condition then
5See, for example, Kaplow (1990) and Becker (1968).
3implies that informal sector wages must fall. We are unaware of other papers that
formally model this mechanism { that reducing the public good can substitute for
increased enforcement.
We also consider what happens when ¯rms in the formal sector are obligated to
pay a minimum wage to workers. A minimum wage breaks the arbitrage condition
linking formal and informal sector wages. It also increases the cost of operating in
the formal sector, and so it can reduce the ability of the government to collect taxes.
Consequently, the presence of a minimum wage strengthens the need for enforce-
ment, and makes a segmented equilibrium suboptimal. The existence of the informal
sector reduces the unemployment cost caused by job rationing, and the presence of
undocumented workers may increase the responsiveness of sector size to changes in
enforcement. We also consider amnesties for undocumented workers, and ¯nd that
at the margin, they are socially bene¯cial. Lastly, we endogenize output price and
allow for taxes to be levied on workers to ensure that our ¯ndings are robust.
To our knowledge, there are only two papers similar to ours in the literature. In
Djajic (1997), the incentive of ¯rms to hire illegal immigrants arises because of a wage
di®erential between the legal and the informal sectors, but not from the obligation to
pay taxes when hiring domestic workers in the legal sector. In our model, ¯rms may
be tempted by the informal sector because of a wage di®erential but also because
they want to evade taxes.6 Also, Djajic provides a positive analysis of the impact
of government policies (enforcement, increase in the stock of illegal workers) but
he does not characterize optimal policies. Epstein and Heizler (2007) construct a
partial equilibrium model in which a representative ¯rm may hire domestic workers
and/or illegal immigrants. This is in contrast with our general equilibrium model in
which ¯rms cannot simultaneously hire both types of workers. Epstein and Heizler
(2007) also do not tax ¯rms to provide a public good; while in our model, tax evasion
incentives play a central role. Like us, they perform an analysis of optimal enforcement
policies.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic version of the
model, Section 3 characterizes optimal policies, and Section 4 examines the extensions
by incorporating the minimum wage, endogenous migration, amnesties, endogenous
price, and worker taxation. Lastly, Section 5 concludes.
6There are taxes in Djajic (1997), but they are paid by employees. We discuss the implications
of employee taxes in our model in the extension section.
42 The Model
We model a simple economy in which ¯rms may choose to operate in either an informal
sector to evade taxes, or to operate in a formal and regulated sector. There are M
domestic workers who can work either in the formal (legal) sector (ML) or the informal
sector (MI) where ML +MI = M. There are also U undocumented workers who can
only work in the informal sector where M > U. Each domestic and undocumented
worker, if hired, supplies one unit of labour inelastically. Domestic workers choose to
work in the sector o®ering the highest wage.
The economy has N entrepreneurs with varying productivity µ. For simplicity,
we assume that productivity is uniformly distributed on [0;1]. Each entrepreneur has
an income endowment k that can be consumed or invested to start-up a ¯rm. The
number of ¯rms in the economy is endogenous and depends on government policies.
Entrepreneurs can choose to not operate a ¯rm (N0 make that choice), to start-up a
¯rm in the formal sector (NL make that choice) or to start-up a ¯rm in the informal
sector (NI make that choice) so N0 +NL +NI = N. Both informal and formal sector
¯rms produce the same good X, which is sold at an exogenous price P, which we
normalize to one.7 To produce output, entrepreneurs need to hire one worker and, to
guarantee full employment, we assume that N > M + U.8
All M + N + U individuals have the identical utility function x + v(G), with
v0 > 0 > v00 and v0(0) ! 1; where x is consumption of a private good and G is the
amount of a public good provided by the government.
An entrepreneur who does not start a ¯rm can consume his endowment and obtain
EU0(µ) = k + v(G). Operating in the formal sector requires k to be invested.9 A
formal ¯rm produces µ units of the domestic good X; and pays the formal wage wL
to its worker and the tax t to the government.10 This yields expected utility in the
7Later, we discuss the implications of making the price endogenous.
8This assumption is for simplicity and without consequences if we interpret \one worker" as a
mass of workers of a size larger than one, and M and U as the number of such masses of workers.
For example, if a mass of workers was of size equal to 10, then the inequality would be satis¯ed with
N = 100 and M + U = 90, and the economy would be populated with 100 entrepreneurs and 900
workers.
9The start-up investment costs could also be some positive fraction of k | with the remainder
of k being consumed by the entrepreneur operating the ¯rm | without changing our results.
10We assume that µ is unobservable. If it were observable, the government would use this infor-
5formal sector of
EUL(µ) = Pµ ¡ wL ¡ t + v(G): (1)
An informal ¯rm has the same investment costs and output as a legal ¯rm but must
pay the informal market wage wI, and incur any sanction imposed in expectation
eµS.11 This expected sanction can be decomposed into two parts, the probability of
detection eµ; where e is the amount of public enforcement and where we have assumed
that larger ¯rms are more likely to be detected, and a non-monetary positive sanction
S: This yields expected utility in the informal sector of
EUI(µ) = Pµ ¡ wI ¡ eµS: (2)
The government levies taxes on the formal sector to ¯nance the provision of a
pure public good G available to all residents and it may invest in costly enforcement
to reduce tax evasion. The cost of a unit of the public good is unity. The cost
of enforcement is simply given by C(e) = c ¢ e. Therefore, the government budget
constraint is
G + ce = NLt: (3)
where NL is the number of ¯rms (entrepreneurs) operating in the formal sector and
paying taxes (endogenized below).
Because sanctions are assumed to be non-monetary, they do not add to government
revenue. Alternatively, sanctions could have been assumed to be monetary, but costly
to collect. In the current case, monetary sanctions would be fully dissipated by
administrative costs.12 Further, note that sanctions are assumed exogenous and ¯nite
| non-maximal | so that some entrepreneurs (and workers) choose to be active in
the informal sector. Obviously, if sanctions were increased without bounds, then it
would be possible to completely eliminate the informal sector as shown in Becker
(1968).
We have assumed that by incurring total costs C(e) = c ¢ e, the government can
detect each ¯rm, with a given µ, operating in the informal sector with probability eµ.
Such an assumption is consistent with an audit environment in which the government
mation to directly target lower taxes to ¯rms on the formal-informal sector margin.
11Informal ¯rms could also be less e±cient producers as in Fortin et al. (1997). This would a®ect
the marginal decision between the sectors, as expected, but our main results would not be a®ected.
12Costly collection of monetary sanctions has long been recognized in the literature. For example,
see Polinsky and Shavell (2007). Note that Djajic (2007) makes an assumption equivalent to ours.
6cannot distinguish between the N entrepreneurs, and so audits all entrepreneurs.
These audits are of course without consequences for those who have either chosen to
operate in the formal sector or to remain idle. We could have also assumed that the
cost of public enforcement is increasing in the size of the population being audited.
For example, C(e) = ¹ c(N) ¢ e with ¹ c0(N) > 0. With N ¯xed, our framework is
consistent with such an audit environment.13
2.1 Entrepreneurs' Decision
Now, consider the optimal decisions of entrepreneurs. Given wages and government
policies, entrepreneurs will decide whether or not to start a ¯rm, and if they start a
¯rm, which type. We restrict attention to the case where at least some entrepreneurs
want to start formal ¯rms.14 Note that the slope of the expected utility function (with
respect to entrepreneur's productive ability) is 1 in the formal sector, and 1¡eS in the
informal sector. The ability level ^ µ that makes an entrepreneur indi®erent between
starting a ¯rm in the formal sector and starting a ¯rm in the informal sector is
determined from the intersection of the two expected utility functions. Because the
relative cost of operating in the informal sector is increasing in µ; all entrepreneurs
with µ > ^ µ prefer to operate in the formal sector, while all entrepreneurs with µ < ^ µ
prefer operating in the informal sector where
^ µ =
wL ¡ wI + t
eS
: (4)
Analogously, we de¯ne ¹ µ as the ability that makes an entrepreneur indi®erent between
starting a ¯rm in the informal sector and not starting a ¯rm at all. Since utilities are
increasing in productivity, all entrepreneurs with µ > ¹ µ prefer starting a ¯rm, while
entrepreneurs with µ < ¹ µ prefer to not start a ¯rm where
¹ µ =
wI + k
1 ¡ eS
: (5)
Since k > 0, the least productive entrepreneur (µ = 0) never starts a ¯rm. Conse-
quently, ¹ µ > 0.
13There are of course analyses in which the probability of detection depends directly on the size of
the informal/criminal sector or on the number of criminals | e.g. Freeman et al. (1996). Generally
such an assumption leads to multiple equilibria, a situation we have chosen to avoid.
14Given our restrictions on v(G), it will never be optimal for government policy to foreclose this
sector completely.
7With ^ µ > ¹ µ (as in Figure 1), there will be an informal sector. Entrepreneurs below
¹ µ do not start-up a ¯rm, those between ¹ µ and ^ µ start a ¯rm in the informal sector,
and those above ^ µ start a ¯rm in the formal sector. In this situation, formal sector
labour demand will be given by NL = N(1 ¡ ^ µ) and informal sector labour demand
will be given by NI = N(^ µ ¡ ¹ µ).
-
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Figure 1: Expected Utility in the Formal and Informal Sectors (^ µ > ¹ µ).
2.2 Equilibrium
To close the model, we need: (1) labour demand to equal labour supply in both sec-
tors, and (2) a wage arbitrage condition equating wages across the sectors to hold
when some domestic workers work in the informal sector. When only undocumented
workers work informally such a condition does not need to be satis¯ed, as undocu-
mented workers cannot work in the formal sector. The market will clear in this case
as long as the formal wage is at least as large as the informal wage so that all domestic
workers prefer to work in the formal sector. Consequently, the equilibrium will take
one of two forms.
In the ¯rst type of equilibrium, labour markets are segmented and no domestic
workers are employed in the informal sector so ML = M and MI = 0. In the
second type of equilibrium, labour markets are not segmented and some domestic
8workers choose to work in the informal sector so MI > 0. The type of equilibrium
obtained depends on government policy and so will be endogenous.
With a °exible informal wage, the supply of workers in the informal sector must
equal the demand for workers by informal ¯rms:
MI + U = N(^ µ ¡ ¹ µ): (6)
With a °exible formal wage, the supply of domestic workers must equal the demand
for workers by formal ¯rms:
ML = N(1 ¡ ^ µ): (7)
From (6) and (7), and using M = MI + ML we ¯nd that ¹ µ¤ = 1 ¡ m ¡ u, where
m = M=N and u = U=N. Therefore, in any equilibrium there is full employment of
undocumented and domestic workers.
Using this full employment condition, together with the de¯nition of ¹ µ given by (5)
we can solve for the wage in the informal sector as a function of government policies.
In any equilibrium, the wage in the informal sector is given by
wI = (1 ¡ eS)(1 ¡ m ¡ u) ¡ k; (8)
and is decreasing in the amount of enforcement.
The full employment condition also implies that all entrepreneurs with productiv-
ity µ at least as large as ¹ µ¤ = 1 ¡ m ¡ u will start up a ¯rm in either the formal or
informal sector, and produce µ. Therefore, total output in the economy is given by
N
Z 1
1¡m¡u
µdµ; (9)
and is independent of taxes and enforcement. In other words, the size of the economy
is ¯xed for given populations of domestic and undocumented workers. Therefore,
the government's problem is a distributional one. Its policy choices will only a®ect
the distribution of total output in the economy between public and private goods,
and across di®erent individuals in the economy (entrepreneurs, domestic workers and
undocumented workers).
2.3 Welfare
The government has a utilitarian objective and cares about all individuals in the
economy, including, to a perhaps lesser degree, undocumented workers assigning them
9a welfare weight ® 2 [0;1]. For the time being, we will restrict government policy
to be of only three dimensions: a tax on ¯rms, a level of public good, and a level of
enforcement. One could also imagine that the government may have some choice over
U, perhaps through a choice of border policy. In the extension section, we consider
in a very simple way how optimal policy changes when U is endogenous and brie°y
discuss the e®ects of other government instruments such as a tax on workers. We
begin by de¯ning the government's objective function.
De¯nition 1 Total weighted welfare is given by:
N
Z 1¡m¡u
0
EU0(µ)dµ + N
Z ^ µ
1¡m¡u
EUI(µ)dµ + N
Z 1
^ µ
EUL(µ)dµ
+ ML [wL + v(G)] + (MI + ®U)[wI + v(G)]:
The ¯rst three terms are the sum of utilities of the entrepreneurs who do not start-
up ¯rms, start up ¯rms in the informal sector and start-up ¯rms in the formal sector,
respectively. The second last term is total utility for domestic workers employed in
the formal sector and the last term is total utility for workers (with weight ® 2 [0;1]
on undocumented workers) employed in the informal sector. Using the expressions
for entrepreneurs' expected utilities, the informal sector wage, and the labour market
clearing conditions, total weighted welfare can be written as a function of government
policies, ­(t;e;G;®), where15
­(t;e;G;®) = N
Z 1
1¡m¡u
µdµ + [N ¡ M ¡ U]k ¡ N
Z ^ µ
1¡m¡u
eµSdµ ¡ N
Z 1
^ µ
tdµ
¡ (1 ¡ ®)U [(1 ¡ eS)(1 ¡ m ¡ u) ¡ k] + (M + N + ®U)v(G):
Any wage paid by entrepreneurs is received by workers. Consequently, terms involving
wages have no net e®ect on total welfare if all workers are counted equally. If the
welfare of undocumented workers is discounted (® < 1), then the welfare loss to
entrepreneurs having to pay the informal wage is greater than the welfare gain to
undocumented workers from receiving the informal wages. Consequently, there will
be a welfare e®ect of enforcement policies through changes in the informal wage if
® 6= 1.
15Detailed derivation of this expression is given in the Appendix.
103 Optimal Policies
We ¯rst characterize optimal policies in the segmented equilibrium and then turn to
the non-segmented equilibrium. All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
3.1 Segmented Equilibrium
In a segmented equilibrium, all domestic workers choose to work in the formal sector,
so ML = M and from (7), we obtain ^ µ¤ = 1 ¡ m. Using the de¯nition of ^ µ given
by (4), we can solve for the equilibrium wage in the formal sector. In a segmented
equilibrium, the formal wage is given by
wL = (1 ¡ m ¡ u) + ueS ¡ k ¡ t; (10)
and is increasing in public enforcement and decreasing in the tax rate.
To guarantee this equilibrium sorting of domestic workers, it must be that wL ¸
wI, or using (8) and (10),
e ¸
t
(1 ¡ m)S
: (11)
The government maximizes its weighted utilitarian welfare function ­(t;e;G;®)
subject to its budget constraint (3) and the constraint (11) where ± is the Lagrange
multiplier on the latter constraint. The ¯rst order conditions on t and e are
[M + N + ®U]v
0(G)M ¡ M ¡ ±
1
(1 ¡ m)S
= 0; (12)
¡[M + N + ®U]v
0(G)c ¡ SN
Z 1¡m
1¡m¡u
µdµ + (1 ¡ ®)US(1 ¡ m ¡ u) + ± = 0; (13)
where G = Mt ¡ ce since in a segmented equilibrium, all domestic workers are em-
ployed in the formal sector (NL = M).
Public enforcement is socially costly for two reasons. First, when c > 0 monitoring
uses up government resources and reduces the amount of public good that can be
provided. Second, ¯rms operating in the informal sector face some expected sanction
which is socially costly. When ® < 1 there is also a social bene¯t of enforcement.
Increased enforcement reduces the informal wage which, when ® < 1, results in a
net social bene¯t since the social gain to informal ¯rms having to pay lower wages
11is greater than the social loss of lower wages to the undocumented workers. It turns
out that for any ®, the social cost of informal ¯rms of having to incur expected
sanctions will always be greater than the potential social bene¯t through changes in
the informal wage.16 This implies that the constraint (11) will be binding and ±¤ > 0.
Optimal policies will be chosen such that t = (1 ¡ m)eS.
We now have our ¯rst Proposition.
Proposition 1 In a segmented equilibrium, the wages in both the formal and informal
sectors are the same and given by w¤
L = w¤
I = (1 ¡ e¤S)(1 ¡ m ¡ u) ¡ k where e¤ is
the optimal level of public enforcement.
Equilibrium wages are decreasing in public enforcement, the number of domestic
workers, and the number of undocumented workers (all else equal). If public enforce-
ment was held ¯xed, as in Djajic (1997), then formal wages would be decreasing in
the number of undocumented workers as in his paper. Here, policies are chosen by
the government and the optimal policies will depend on the number of undocumented
workers. Further, the government by its choice of enforcement removes any incentive
for ¯rms operating in the formal sector to switch to the informal sector in order to pay
a lower wage. Optimal enforcement policies ensure that wages are equated across the
two sectors. Consequently, ¯rms who switch to the informal sector would do so solely
to evade taxes. This is in contrast to Djajic (1997) in which there may be a strictly
positive net wage di®erential between the two sectors in a segmented equilibrium and
thus ¯rms may be attracted to the informal sector hoping to reduce their wage bill.
We now turn to the determination of optimal policies.
Using the two ¯rst-order conditions and the binding constraint, the optimal pro-
vision of public good is determined by the following modi¯ed Samuelson condition:
[N +M +®U]v
0(G) =
2
4
1 + 1
M(1¡m)
³
N
R 1¡m
1¡m¡u µdµ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)U(1 ¡ m ¡ u)
´
1 ¡ 1
M(1¡m)
c
S
3
5: (14)
From this modi¯ed Samuelson condition, we have the following Proposition:
16This follows from noting that the sum of the second and third term in (13) is always negative
for any value of ®. See Appendix for details.
12Proposition 2 In a segmented equilibrium, the optimal public good provision is a)
lower than in a ¯rst-best outcome, b) decreasing in the marginal enforcement cost,
and c) decreasing in the number of undocumented workers when ® = 0.
E±ciency requires that the sum of the marginal bene¯ts from consumption of
the public good equals the marginal cost of provision. Lump-sum taxes and costless
enforcement would guarantee e±ciency as the sum of the marginal bene¯ts would be
equated to 1. With costly public enforcement, c > 0, the denominator of (14) is less
than one and given enforcement imposes a net social cost, the numerator is greater
than one. Therefore, the marginal social cost of providing the public good will be
greater than 1 and public good provision in the segmented equilibrium is therefore
lower than in the ¯rst-best. Further, an increase in the marginal enforcement costs
c increases the social marginal cost of providing the public good. Therefore, for
the modi¯ed Samuelson condition (14) to continue to hold when public enforcement
becomes more costly, the optimal amount of G being provided must go down.
When there is an increase in the number of undocumented workers in a segmented
equilibrium more entrepreneurs will necessarily operate in the informal sector. Con-
sequently more ¯rms will face the expected sanction. Therefore, the social cost of
enforcement goes up. Given the constraint is optimally binding, any increase in
taxes (public good) will necessarily be accompanied by an increase in enforcement.
Therefore this increase in the social cost of enforcement also increases the social cost
of providing the public good. When there is zero welfare weight on undocumented
workers, the increase in the number of undocumented workers has no e®ect on the
sum of the social marginal bene¯t of the public good. Consequently, the amount of
public good being provided will go down as U increases when ® = 0. When ® > 0,
then there is also a social bene¯t to an increase in the number of undocumented
workers and it is not clear what will happen to public good provision in this case.
Likewise, an increase in ® increases the social cost of providing the public good but
also increases the marginal bene¯t of the public good. Therefore, the e®ect of ® on
optimal policies will be ambiguous.
Proposition 2, together with the government's budget constraint and the binding
constraint, G¤ = t¤M ¡ ce¤ = [M(1 ¡ m)S ¡ c]e¤, implies that when ® = 0 an in-
crease in the number of undocumented workers will also reduce the optimal amount
of enforcement. Proposition 2, however, does not necessarily imply that optimal en-
forcement decreases with the marginal cost of public enforcement c. From Proposition
132, we have
dG¤
dc
= [M(1 ¡ m)S ¡ c]
@e¤
@c
¡ e
¤ < 0: (15)
Therefore, @e¤=@c could be positive and (15) could still be satis¯ed. Intuitively, the
government could compensate for the diminution of available resources by increasing
taxes and enforcement, but overall the direct strain on resources must dominate so
public good provision must go down. We have the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 In a segmented equilibrium, optimal enforcement is a) increasing (de-
creasing) in the marginal enforcement cost c when the absolute value of the elasticity
of the marginal bene¯t of the public good is greater than (less than) unity, and b)
decreasing in the number of undocumented workers when ® = 0.
With an increase in the marginal cost of enforcement, the government has an
incentive to reduce the amount of enforcement. At the same time, for any given
enforcement level this increase in cost uses up more resources and so reduces the
amount of public good the government can provide. This implies that the marginal
bene¯t of providing the public good is also higher, and one way to increase public
good provision is to increase compliance by increasing enforcement. If the absolute
value of the elasticity of the marginal bene¯t is large, then a small decrease in G (via
an increase in c) results in a large reduction in the marginal bene¯t of the public
good. Consequently, the government will optimally want to increase enforcement to
push back up the amount of public good provided. The converse is then true.
To our knowledge, this result that optimal public enforcement may increase with
an increase in the marginal cost of enforcement is original. Other papers have con-
sidered a framework with tax evasion and public good provision (e.g. Kaplow 1990,
Cremer and Gahvari 2000), but their focus was di®erent and the phenomenon we
have identi¯ed was not uncovered.17
To summarize, the government will optimally choose taxes and public enforcement
such that the constraint ensuring domestic workers are at least as well o® working
17Kaplow (1990) is more interested in optimal tax formulae (µ a la Ramsey) in the presence of tax
evasion and enforcement, so his focus is on the relative size of various consumption taxes rather than
on the tradeo® between public enforcement and the overall level of taxes. As for Cremer and Gahvari
(2000), they are interested in tax competition and ¯scal harmonization in the presence of tax evasion
and do not focus on the characterization of optimal enforcement in a simple one country/government
model.
14in the formal than in the informal sector is just binding. Consequently, equilibrium
wages in the formal and informal sectors will be the same. Second, any change in
enforcement policy will optimally be accompanied by a change in tax policy in the
same direction, that is, taxes and public enforcement are complementary policies in a
segmented equilibrium. Third, the size of the formal sector in the segmented equilib-
rium will be ¯xed. Consequently, the ratio of tax rate to public enforcement will be
independent of marginal enforcement costs, the welfare weight on the undocumented
workers and the number of undocumented workers. It also follows from the govern-
ment's budget constraint that the ratio of public good provision to public enforcement
will also be independent of ® and U, but that an increase in the marginal enforce-
ment costs reduces public good provision relative to enforcement. We are also able
to say something about what happens to equilibrium wages only under some circum-
stances.18 Of course what happens to workers' utility will also depend on changes in
optimal public good provision which can move in the opposite direction.
3.2 Non-Segmented Equilibrium
In a non-segmented labour market, some domestic workers choose to work in the
informal sector, MI = M ¡ ML > 0. Formal and informal wages must be equal in
equilibrium as domestic workers are willing to take jobs in either sector. Equilibrium
wages are pinned down by the least pro¯table ¯rm in the informal sector and from
(8) are given by:
w
¤
I = w
¤
L = [1 ¡ eS](1 ¡ m ¡ u) ¡ k: (16)
Equilibrium wages in both sector are independent of the tax rate, but are a decreas-
ing function of public enforcement. These wages are the same as in the segmented
equilibrium.
Given the equality of wages in both sectors, it follows from the de¯nition of ^ µ
given by (4), that in equilibrium
^ µ
¤ =
t
eS
: (17)
Di®erentiating (17), we obtain
18For example, equilibrium wages will be decreasing (increasing) in the marginal enforcement cost
if optimal enforcement is increasing (decreasing) in c.
15@^ µ¤
@t
=
1
eS
> 0;
@^ µ¤
@e
= ¡
t
e2S
< 0: (18)
Recall there is full employment and ¹ µ¤ = 1 ¡ m ¡ u.
The government maximizes the weighted utilitarian welfare function ­(t;e;G;®)
subject to its budget constraint (3) and to a constraint that ensures that the number
of ¯rms in the legal sector is no larger than the number of domestic workers, that is,
^ µ¤ ¸ 1 ¡ m or using (17)
e ·
t
(1 ¡ m)S
: (19)
The above constraint will provide a simple way to di®erentiate between the two
types of equilibria. When it is binding, the equilibrium is segmented as can be seen
from the discussion above, and if it is slack, the equilibrium is non-segmented. Let
Á be the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint, the ¯rst order conditions on t and e
are given by:
[M + N + ®U]v
0(G)
Ã
N(1 ¡ ^ µ
¤) ¡ Nt
@^ µ¤
@t
!
¡ N(1 ¡ ^ µ
¤) ¡ Á
1
(1 ¡ m)S
= 0; (20)
[M+N+®U]v
0(G)
"
¡Nt
@^ µ¤
@e
¡ c
#
¡SN
Z ^ µ¤
¹ µ¤
µdµ+(1¡®)US(1¡m¡u)+Á = 0: (21)
To properly analyze these ¯rst order conditions, two separate issues need to be in-
vestigated. First we need to know if the constraint is binding or not. Intuitively, we
need to know if the government optimally chooses policies so that the labour mar-
kets are segmented or not segmented. The second issue is to describe what the tax
and enforcement policies look like given we are in a non-segmented case. We begin
with this latter issue and assume that Á = 0.19 Given this, we have the following
Proposition:
Proposition 4 In a non-segmented equilibrium, the optimal size of the formal sec-
tor is decreasing in the number of undocumented workers, in the marginal cost of
enforcement, and in the welfare weight put on undocumented workers.
19Note that we assume that the term N(1 ¡ ^ µ¤) ¡ Nt@^ µ=@t in equation (20) is strictly positive,
re°ecting the fact that the government chooses a tax rate on the left-hand side of the La®er curve.
16As the number of undocumented workers increases, the net social cost of using
public enforcement increases. There are more ¯rms in the informal sector and they
are all paying the expected sanction. There is a social gain via the reduction in the
informal wage but this gain is always less than the social cost of informal ¯rms facing
an expected sanction. Therefore, an increase in U gives the government an incentive
to reduce public enforcement (relative to taxes) so ^ µ¤ moves up and the size of the
formal sector shrinks. An increase in c increases the resource cost of using public
enforcement to keep ¯rms in the formal sector. Consequently, the government will
optimally reduce enforcement relative to taxes when the marginal cost of enforcement
increases. Finally, an increase in the welfare weight on undocumented workers reduces
the social gain from using public enforcement via the reduction in the informal wage.
Once again, the government has an incentive to reduce enforcement relative to taxes
and the size of the formal sector shrinks with an increase in ®.
Unlike in a segmented equilibrium, the ratio of taxes to public enforcement is
not pinned down. Consequently, optimal public enforcement and taxes are no longer
complementary policies. Further, an increase in the number of undocumented workers
increases not just the size of the informal sector (as in a segmented equilibrium) but
also the size of the formal sector through its e®ect on optimal policies. The ratio
of public good provision to enforcement now depends on the welfare weight put on
undocumented workers and the number of undocumented workers. To see this, we
can write the government's budget constraint using (17) as G¤ = N(1¡ ^ µ¤)t¤ ¡ce¤ =
[N(1¡^ µ¤)S^ µ¤¡c]e¤ which implies that G¤=e¤ is increasing in ^ µ¤ and from Proposition
3 it follows that this ratio is increasing in ® and U.
We now assess the condition under which it is optimal for the government to
choose a segmented equilibrium or, equivalently, ensure that the constraint (19) is
binding.20 To do so we will examine the left hand side of ¯rst order condition on e
just as it is about to become binding, i.e. as t=(eS) ! 1¡m. Since the constraint is
not yet binding Á = 0, but ^ µ¤ ! 1 ¡ m. The left hand side of ¯rst order condition
(21) becomes
[M+N+®U]v
0(G)
£
N(1 ¡ m)
2S ¡ c
¤
¡SN
Z 1¡m
1¡m¡u
µdµ+(1¡®)US(1¡m¡u): (22)
As a benchmark, consider the case in which there are no undocumented workers,
20Although Djajic (1997) identi¯es the possibility of these two types of equilibria, there is no
discussion in his paper about the optimality of either type of equilibrium nor conditions under
which one type of equilibrium is socially preferred to the other.
17that is, U = 0. In this case, all ¯rms operating in a segmented equilibrium are
operating in the formal sector. To support this type of equilibrium, the government
needs to spend resources on monitoring and auditing ¯rms. But, because there are no
¯rms operating in the informal sector, no sanctioning is imposed and there is no social
loss from enforcement. It follows from (22) that the government will optimally enforce
a fully segmented labour market if and only if c < N(1 ¡ m)2S. Not surprisingly,
if enforcement is too costly, it is preferable to leave some domestic workers in the
informal sector. The higher the sanction, the more e®ective enforcement is for a
given level of public enforcement e, and so a larger range of marginal enforcement
costs can support a segmented equilibrium.
Now, with undocumented workers some ¯rms operate in the informal sector even
in the segmented equilibrium, and these ¯rms face costly expected sanctions. This
reduces the attractiveness of using public enforcement to maintain a segmented equi-
librium. Therefore, the range of marginal enforcement costs that can support the
optimality of a segmented equilibrium is smaller than when U = 0.
Another way to see this is to note that for a non-segmented equilibrium to occur
it must be that ^ µ > 1 ¡ m. It also follows from (21), (16), and (18) that in a non-
segmented equilibrium ^ µ¤ > [c=NS]
1=2 for any value of U and ®. Together, these
expressions imply that it is possible to have a non-segmented equilibrium for some
c < N(1 ¡ m)2S. Further, when c > N(1 ¡ m)2S a non-segmented equilibrium will
necessarily be obtained. Therefore, we have the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 A necessary condition for the government to optimally enforce a seg-
mented equilibrium is c < N(1¡m)2S, and a su±cient condition for the government
to optimally enforce a non-segmented equilibrium is c > N(1 ¡ m)2S.
4 Extensions
4.1 Amnesties
In this section, we consider the consequences of legalizing the status of some of the
undocumented workers. To do this, we conduct the following exercise: marginally in-
crease M while reducing U by the same amount. As we are considering only marginal
changes in population, it is natural to assume that the economy remains in the same
18type of equilibria.
First, we look at what happens to total welfare as U decreases marginally. Di®er-
entiating the maximized total welfare ­¤(t;e;G;®) with respect to U, and applying
the Envelope Theorem, we obtain
d­¤
dU
= ®[w
¤
I + v(G
¤)] + (1 ¡ e
¤S)(1 ¡ ®)u > 0: (23)
According to the ¯rst term in (23), fewer undocumented workers directly reduces
welfare, unless the welfare of undocumented workers is not valued, as it would be the
case if ® = 0. A reduction the the supply of undocumented workers also has a welfare
e®ect by a®ecting the informal wage. A decrease in the supply of undocumented work-
ers leads to a higher informal wage, and because undocumented workers are weighted
less than entrepreneurs (unless ® = 1), the higher informal wage is welfare reducing.
This e®ect is captured by the second term. Overall, the above expression holds re-
gardless of whether the economy is in a non-segmented or segmented equilibrium but
of course the value of the expression will depend on the optimal policies.
Consider now the e®ect on total welfare of an increase in M. Since the e®ect of a
change in M depends on whether the economy is in a segmented or in a non-segmented
equilibrium, both forms of equilibria will be analyzed separately. Di®erentiating
total welfare in the case of a non-segmented equilibrium, and applying the Envelope
Theorem, we obtain
d­¤
dM
= [w
¤
L + v(G
¤)] + (1 ¡ e
¤S)(1 ¡ ®)u: (24)
The interpretation of this expression is similar to the one given above. The ¯rst term
is the direct gain in welfare from one more domestic worker. The increase in the
number of domestic workers also leads to a lower informal wage. For any ® < 1,
entrepreneurs are valued more than undocumented workers and a reduction in the
wage paid to these workers is bene¯cial. This e®ect is captured by the second term.
In the case of a segmented equilibrium, there will be an additional positive term in
(24) re°ecting the fact that domestic workers are fully employed in the legal sector.
Changing the status of an undocumented worker employed in the informal sector to
a domestic worker employed in the formal sector necessarily increases public good
provision by increasing the tax base and total welfare increases by an additional
[N + M + ®U]v0(G¤)t¤.
To determine whether an amnesty is optimal in either type of equilibrium, we
simply look at the di®erence between the two expressions in (23) and (24) given
19dU = ¡dM < 0 and note that in either type of equilibrium the informal and formal
wages will be the same. In the case of a non-segmented equilibrium, we ¯nd
d­
dM
¡
d­
dU
= (1 ¡ ®)[w
¤
L + v(G
¤)]: (25)
Therefore, in a non-segmented equilibrium, legalizing the status of an undocu-
mented worker will be welfare-improving when ® 6= 1 and will be welfare-neutral
when ® = 1. Because in a segmented equilibrium replacing an undocumented worker
by a documented worker necessarily implies that one more ¯rm will pay taxes, legal-
izing the status of an undocumented worker will be welfare-improving for all values of
®. This exercise, of course, is only valid for marginal changes. Legalizing the status
of a large number of undocumented workers would necessarily change the optimal
policies and possibly the type of equilibria in which the economy rests.
In the positive analysis of Djajic (1997), an amnesty had no impact in a non-
segmented equilibrium and decreased the wage of legal unskilled workers in a seg-
mented equilibrium. We obtain di®erent results for two reasons. First, because we
allow for undocumented workers to be valued less, an amnesty may be bene¯cial
even in a non-segmented equilibrium. As in Djajic (1997), granting an amnesty to
undocumented workers in a non-segmented equilibrium does not change the number
of legal/illegal workers. The newly documented worker will simply displace another
worker in the legal sector. However, since the newly documented worker receives full
weight (instead of a weight of ® < 1), welfare may increase. We admit that the
di®erence is due to the way we constructed our welfare function, and consequently
is not very surprising. The second di®erence is more fundamental. In Djajic (1997)
where enforcement policy is exogenous, wages in the formal and the informal sector
may di®er in a segmented equilibrium. In this paper, we take into account how op-
timal polices change with the number of both domestic and undocumented workers.
In equilibrium, as stated by Proposition 1, both wages are equalized, and given by
w¤ = (P ¡e¤S)(1¡m¡u)¡k. A marginal increase in M, combine with a marginal
reduction in U such that dM = ¡dU would have no e®ect on equilibrium wages
in either type of equilibria. Note that this result would not likely hold for a \large
amnesty" where the optimal policies change.
204.2 Minimum Wage
Firms, in addition to evading taxes, may also avoid other (enforced) labour market
regulations such as minimum wage legislation when operating in the informal sector.
To investigate the impact of this additional potential incentive to operate outside of
the formal sector, we now introduce an exogenous minimum wage denoted by ¹ w, that
must be paid to all individuals working in the formal sector. Further, we assume that
the penalty for evading the minimum wage and/or taxes are equivalent.21 We ¯rst
determine how a ¯xed minimum wage in the formal sector a®ects optimal enforcement
and optimal public good provision and then discuss how a minimum wage a®ects the
condition determining whether the government will optimally enforce a segmented
equilibrium.
In our framework, we assume that any documented workers who cannot ¯nd a
job in the formal sector can (and will) work in the informal sector instead.22 Conse-
quently, there will be full employment of all workers so ¹ µ¤ = 1 ¡ m ¡ u. This implies
the following: First, total production will continue to be given by (9) and will be
independent of all government policies including the minimum wage. Second, the
informal wage will continue to be given by (8).
With a minimum wage, the wage in the formal sector is no longer °exible and is
equal to the minimum wage. Consequently, the formal sector cuto® will now be
^ µ
¤ =
¹ w ¡ w¤
I + t
eS
: (26)
Taxes and the minimum wage a®ect the size of the formal sector in the same manner.
As taxes (or the minimum wage) increase, more entrepreneurs choose the informal
sector. An increase in enforcement has the opposite e®ect on the size of the formal
sector. Finally, the government's objective function given the minimum wage is the
same as De¯nition 1 except with wL = ¹ w which we denote by ­(t;e;G;®; ¹ w). We now
discuss the optimal policies given the minimum wage in the two types of equilibria,
starting with the segmented equilibrium.
21Consequently, no ¯rm would ever choose to evade only one of these regulations. All ¯rms in the
formal sector will respect both, and all ¯rms in the informal sector will not.
22We have worked out the equilibria and optimal policies for the case in which workers who would
like to work in the legal sector and are unlucky cannot switch ex post to an informal sector job. This
is the case in which an excess supply in the legal sector corresponds to involuntary unemployment.
It turns out that the algebra for that case is more involved but that the results are fairly similar.
21In general, the introduction of a minimum wage creates excess formal labour
supply, but in a segmented equilibrium, all domestic workers must be employed in
the formal sector. How is this possible? The answer resides in the government having
additional policy instruments that can a®ect demand for labour in the formal sector.
The minimum wage discourages ¯rms from operating legally, but at the same time
the expected sanction discourages ¯rms from operating informally. If e is su±ciently
large relative to ¹ w and t, excess supply can be eliminated so that ML = M, and
^ µ¤ = 1 ¡ m. A government who wants all domestic workers to be employed in the
formal sector can therefore obtain the desired result by ensuring that
e ¸
¹ w ¡ w¤
I + t
(1 ¡ m)S
: (27)
The government maximizes ­(t;e;G;®; ¹ w) subject its budget constraint (3) and
the constraint (27). The ¯rst order conditions on t and e are given by
[N +M +®U]v
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With the Lagrange multiplier ¹ Á on the constraint (27), these ¯rst order conditions
are similar to the ones obtained without a minimum wage. However, an important
di®erence is worth highlighting. Equations (28) and (29) both contain the additional
term ¡( ¹ w ¡ w¤
I) multiplied by the derivative of ^ µ¤ with respect to t and e, respectively.
Without a minimum wage, the decision to operate legally is based solely on the
di®erence between taxes and expected punishment, implying that for the marginal
entrepreneur, the gain from evading taxes must equal the expected sanction.
It is clear that the constraint (27) will bind at the optimum. Intuitively, if it
were slack and given enforcement is costly, the government could always reduce e and
maintain segmentation. Given the binding constraint, the modi¯ed Samuelson con-
dition describing the optimal level of the public good without a minimum wage given
by (14) also applies when a minimum wage is present. As this condition depends
only on exogenous parameters and G, it follows that the level of public good in a
22segmented equilibrium will be the same with and without a minimum wage. Interest-
ingly however, providing this same amount of public good given the minimum wage
will require higher taxes and more enforcement as condition (27) is more restrictive
in the presence of a minimum wage. It follows that the informal wage will be lower
with a minimum wage than without a minimum wage in the segmented equilibrium.
Finally, given (14) still holds with a minimum wage it follows that Propositions 2 and
3 also hold.23
In a non-segmented equilibrium with a minimum wage in place, the formal labour
market no longer clears; some workers who want minimum wage jobs may not be able
to ¯nd them. However, relative to a situation with no informal sector, this excess
supply will not translate into unemployment. However, some domestic workers will be
forced to work in the informal sector because of the excess supply in the legal sector.
Once again the government maximizes the weighted welfare function ­(t;e;G;®; ¹ w)
subject to its budget constraint (3) and to a constraint that ensures some domestic
workers are in the informal sector, that is, ^ µ ¸ 1 ¡ m or using (4) with wL = ¹ w,
e ·
¹ w ¡ w¤
I + t
(1 ¡ m)S
: (30)
The above constraint will again provide a simple way to di®erentiate between a seg-
mented and a non-segmented equilibria. When it is binding, the equilibrium is seg-
mented as discussed above, while if it is slack the equilibrium is non-segmented. The
¯rst order conditions on t and e are given by (28) and (29), subject its budget con-
straint (3) with ¹ Á = 0.
In a non-segmented equilibrium, ^ µ¤ > 1 ¡ m and any marginal change in ^ µ¤ will
impact public good provision through tax revenues, but will not a®ect total welfare
otherwise. The presence of a minimum wage gives entrepreneurs an additional reason
to participate in the informal sector. Consequently, for the marginal entrepreneur the
expected sanction is strictly larger than the gain from evading taxes.
A minimum wage a®ects the provision of the public good because it a®ects the
cost of using both instruments. On the one hand, a higher level of public good
can be achieved by increasing taxes. An increase in taxes pushes more ¯rms to
operate informally, and this is costly because more ¯rms are exposed to the expected
sanction instead of paying taxes and, with a minimum wage, the expected sanction
23Obviously wages cannot be the same across sectors given a minimum wage, and Proposition 1
does not hold.
23is strictly larger than taxes paid. On the other hand, a higher level of the public
good can be achieved by increasing enforcement instead. With higher enforcement,
fewer ¯rms operate informally. Consequently, we cannot say if the presence of a
minimum wage implies higher or lower levels of the public good in a non-segmented
equilibrium. However, we can argue that the presence of a minimum wage favours
the use of enforcement versus taxes in a non-segmented equilibrium. Intuitively, a
minimum wage makes the informal sector more attractive, so the government reacts
by monitoring more and taxing less.
Finally, we need to assess when it is optimal for the government to choose a
segmented equilibrium. To do so, we examine the left hand side of the ¯rst order
condition on e just as it is about to become binding. Since the constraint is not yet
binding ¹ Á = 0, but ^ µ¤ ! 1 ¡ m. The left hand side of ¯rst order condition (29)
becomes
[M + N + ®U]v
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Thus, when there are no undocumented workers and a minimum wage, a govern-
ment maximizing total welfare will never enforce a segmented equilibrium. Because
of the additional bene¯t of being in the informal sector, enforcement is not as e®ec-
tive. In fact, without undocumented workers, as ^ µ¤ approaches (1 ¡ m), it becomes
totally unresponsive to changes in e. The presence of undocumented workers may in
fact increase the range of marginal enforcement costs that can support a segmented
equilibrium because it increases the responsiveness of ^ µ¤ to changes in monitoring.
4.3 Endogenous Undocumented Immigrants
So far, we considered the number of undocumented immigrants as an exogenous
variable, however it is perhaps more natural to assume that the level of undocumented
migration is a function of the opportunities available in the host country. We now
assume that undocumented workers enter the country as long as jobs paying some
¯xed reservation utility wR exist. This reservation utility can be thought of as simply
the wage in the source country, or as that wage augmented by any moving or migration
24costs, plus any possible utility from public good provision in the source country.24 In
this way, we could imagine that captured within these costs is some border control
policy. Varying this reservation utility can be thought of as a very reduced form way
of capturing the impact of border policy.
Without a®ecting the general structure, the addition of endogenous immigration
choices introduces new trade o®s in the design of optimal policies. On the one hand,
most of the important results still apply, including Proposition 1 stating that wages
are equalized across the formal and informal sectors in both types of equilibrium. On
the other hand, a government who maximizes total welfare may ¯nd it advantageous
to expand public spending in order to attract cheap labour from abroad, and therefore
border enforcement may be less desirable than ¯rm-level enforcement.
We assume that any informal wage satisfying wI +v(G) > wR will induce undoc-
umented immigrants to migrate until wI = wR ¡v(G). We can use this expression to
determine the number of undocumented workers as a function of government policies
by ¯rst solving for
¹ µ =
wR ¡ v(G) + k
1 ¡ eS
; (32)
which together for the expression ¹ µ¤ = 1¡m¡u,25 and recalling that the level of the
public good is given by G = N(1 ¡ ^ µ)t ¡ ce, implies that the ratio of undocumented
workers to entrepreneurs as a function of government policies is given by
~ u = ~ U=N = (1 ¡ m) ¡
wR ¡ v
³
N(1 ¡ ^ µ)t ¡ ce
´
+ k
1 ¡ eS
: (33)
The properties of this ratio of undocumented workers to entrepreneurs are quite
intuitive. The ratio is decreasing in the reservation utility and in the number of
domestic workers, and increasing in the level of public good provision. Similarly to
De¯nition 1, we can construct De¯nition 2:
De¯nition 2 Total weighted welfare ­(t;e;G;®;wR) is given by:
­(t;e;G;®;wR) = N
R 1
1¡m¡~ u µdµ + [N ¡ M ¡ ~ U]k ¡ N(eS)
R ^ µ¤
1¡m¡~ u µdµ ¡ N
R 1
^ µ¤ tdµ
¡(1 ¡ ®)~ U[wR ¡ v(G)] + [N + M + ®~ U]v
³
tN(1 ¡ ^ µ¤) ¡ ce
´
:
24Our model is related to that of Harris and Todaro (1970) on rural/urban migration. In Harris-
Todaro model, agents migrate until expected income between locations is equalized. In ours, agents
migrate until expected utility, including that from the public good, is equated across locations.
25There will still be full employment because the labour markets clear in both sectors.
25Possible equilibrium still take one of two forms: it can either be segmented, po-
tentially allowing for a formal wage higher than the informal wage, or it can be
non-segmented in which case the formal wage will be driven down to the informal
wage (reservation utility wR less utility of public good provision). We consider these
two cases in turn.
In a non-segmented equilibrium, the labour market clearing condition requires
that wL = wI = wR ¡ v(G). Therefore, from the de¯nition of ^ µ given by (4) we have
^ µ¤ = t=(eS). From (33), it follows that increasing enforcement e shrinks the informal
sector and reduces the number of undocumented immigrants on both margins. If
the reservation utility is loosely taken to proxy for some border enforcement policy,
then increasing border enforcement (increasing wR) discourages entry and reduces
the size of the informal sector given other government policies. Public good provision
on the other hand, increases the size of the illegal sector by encouraging migration
of illegal immigrants. Naturally, it requires that this public good is perfectly non-
excludable. Note that in this environment, entrepreneurs will have a direct bene¯t
from the public good as well as an indirect bene¯t from reduced wages. Workers will
have the opposite.
The government chooses taxes using exactly the same tradeo®s as before, except
now there is an additional bene¯t of higher taxes. By raising taxes and increasing
public good provision, the government lowers the informal wage and expands the size
of the informal sector. Expanding the informal sector has both a positive and a neg-
ative consequence. Because more ¯rms operate in the informal sector, more wasteful
punishments are levied. At the same time, total production { including informal
production { increases. Lower wages also redistributes income from undocumented
workers to entrepreneurs. If the welfare weight on undocumented workers is less than
one, this is socially bene¯cial. If ® = 1 there is no additional bene¯t. Notice however,
that it also redistributes income away from domestic workers since their wages are tied
to those in the informal sector. Enforcement has the complete reverse e®ect. When
e increases, it causes the size of the informal sector to shrink and total production to
fall as ¹ µ¤ increases.
It is also interesting to see what happen when wR falls, as if border enforcement
were to be relaxed. Lower reservation wage wR expands the size of the informal sec-
tor, but only along one margin. It increases the number of ¯rms operating in the
informal sector, without changing the number of ¯rms operating in the formal sec-
tor. Consequently, relaxing border enforcement is more attractive relative to relaxing
26enforcement on ¯rms. Obviously, this is only true if domestic workers and ¯rms are
weighted equally; if workers are valued more, increasing border enforcement may be
more desirable since it increases wages.
In a segmented equilibrium, the labour market clearing condition is given by
wL ¸ wI = wR ¡ v(G). With a °exible formal wage, the supply of workers in this
sector must equal the demand for workers by formal ¯rms so M = N(1 ¡ ^ µ) which
yields ^ µ¤ = 1 ¡ m and the equilibrium formal wage: w¤
L = (1 ¡ m)eS +wR ¡ t. Even
with endogenous illegal immigration, Proposition 1 applies. Legal and illegal wages
must be equalized, w¤
L = w¤
I. Again, there is no reason to increase enforcement above
what is necessary to ensure that all domestic workers are in the formal sector. Illegal
immigration increases output. Obviously, if workers were to be more valued than
entrepreneurs the situation could be di®erent as illegal immigration lowers wages.
When considering the optimal policy in the segmented equilibrium, much of the
same intuition will carry through as discussed for the case of the non-segmented equi-
librium. The government can expand production by reducing the cost of setting up
a ¯rm in the informal sector by decreasing e or increasing G. It can strategically
manipulate the amount of the public good to reduce informal sector wages and redis-
tribute the surplus toward entrepreneurs operating in the informal sector. It can also
reduce border enforcement to expand output.
4.4 Endogenous Price
So far, we have also taken the price of the good produced in the economy as exoge-
nous and have shown that regardless of how the government weights the welfare of
undocumented workers maximized total welfare is increasing in the number of undoc-
umented workers. But by holding price ¯xed, we are ignoring the potential impact
an increase in the supply of undocumented workers may have on the equilibrium
price. Empirically it has been shown that an increase in the size of the low-skilled
immigrant population can put downward pressure on low-skilled wages and thereby
depress prices of the goods and services produced by this labour (Cortes, 2008). How
would allowing for an endogenous price a®ect our conclusions?
Consider the case of an increase in U. With a ¯xed price, this increase has two
e®ects. First, it attracts entrepreneurs into the informal sector who were previously
not operating ¯rms. These entrepreneurs are now better o® and consequently, total
27welfare increases. Total production also increases. Second, there are now more indi-
viduals bene¯ting from the public good which also increases total welfare. These two
e®ects are present when the price is endogenous but there is also an additional e®ect.
The increased production puts downward pressure on the price which reduces the
value of output produced by all ¯rms in the economy and consequently, the welfare
of all entrepreneurs. At the same time, everyone bene¯ts from the lower price. It
is possible to show that the net e®ect of an increase in U on total welfare remains
positive even when the price is endogenous.26 It is also the case that having price
endogenous does not change the relative trade-o®s between government polices.
4.5 Taxes on Workers
In this paper, we restrict attention to taxing ¯rms. If the government could also tax
workers in the formal sector, our model would generate qualitative the same insights.
Informal workers would face some probability of detection, say ½, and some sanction
F. Sanctions on workers would also impose a social cost. Formal workers would pay
a wage tax, ¿, used to ¯nance the public good. The government would now have at
its disposal potentially two additional instruments, ½ and ¿.27
To support a segmented equilibrium in this framework, it must be that wL ¡¿ ¸
wI ¡ ½F or using the wage expressions (8) and (10), eS(1 ¡ m) + ½F ¸ t + ¿.
This constraint will still bind, and consequently, wages (net of taxes and expected
penalties) will be equalized across the formal and informal sectors in both types of
equilibria, segmented and non-segmented.
In a segmented equilibrium, the government would generate total tax revenue of
26For the price of output produced in the economy to be endogenous, an additional good with a
¯xed price must be incorporated into the framework. The above conclusion is obtained assuming
standard Cobb-Douglas preferences over the two goods.
27One issue to consider is whether ½ is correlated with e at the ¯rm level. The simplest case
would involve ¯rms and workers being audited independently by two separate agencies without
information sharing. Then all workers would face the same audit probability ½ independent of e.
With information sharing, solving for the equilibrium could be more challenging. The probability
a given worker is audited would depend on the particular µ of the ¯rm that he or she is matched
with. As long as µ is not observable however, every worker would face the same expected probability
of audit, which would be endogenously determined in equilibrium. In what follows, we refer to the
simple case with no information sharing.
28(t + ¿)N. Because both forms of taxes share the same ¯xed tax base, and generate
the same marginal social cost (as shown in the last paragraph), they are perfect
substitutes. Enforcement on ¯rms and workers however, may behave di®erently. The
¯rst-order conditions on ¯rms' enforcement would be una®ected, while a similar ¯rst-
order condition on workers' enforcement would be added. Since the two forms of
enforcement may impose di®erent social costs, their relative merit would depend on
F versus S.
In a non-segmented equilibrium, the productivity cut-o® between formal and in-
formal ¯rms will be (t + ¿ ¡ ½F)=eS. Again, the tax bases are the same. Moreover,
those tax bases are a®ected the same way by variations in t, and in ¿. Consequently,
both forms of taxation are again perfect substitutes, while enforcement may behave
di®erently.
Similarly, we could allow the government to choose to tax formal consumption.
If formal and informal consumption goods are perfect substitutes, they would have
to be available at the same price. Enforcement would have to be su±ciently high to
prevent the legal sector from being foreclosed. This model would be di®erent in a
subtle way since the bene¯t of avoiding taxes would be proportional to productivity,
which is not the case in our basic model. But regardless, the same qualitative results
would obtain.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a simple model of tax evasion with an informal sector, and
consider the role of undocumented workers on optimal tax and enforcement policy.
We ¯nd that optimal policies play a crucial role in the wage determination process
and lead wages to be equalized even when domestic and undocumented workers are
not competing against each other in the same sector. This result does not arise in
previous papers that have considered illegal immigration.
We also ¯nd that enforcement may not always be decreasing in its cost, and that
governments will optimally enforce market segmentation if enforcement costs are not
too high. We consider several extensions. First, we endogenizing the amount of illegal
migration, and ¯nd a novel role for the public good. Our public good can be used to
depress domestic wages in the informal sector, and thereby redistribute income from
undocumented workers to domestic entrepreneurs. In this environment as well, we
29see that ¯rm level enforcement is socially more desirable than border controls. Lastly,
we introduce a minimum wage as a means of breaking the wage arbitrage condition
and altering agents responsiveness to enforcement policy.
6 Appendix
Derivation of Government Objective Function
The N¹ µ entrepreneurs who don't start a ¯rm collectively receive
N¹ µ[k + v(G)]:
The N(^ µ¡¹ µ) entrepreneurs who start a ¯rm in the informal sector collectively receive
(1 ¡ eS)N
Z ^ µ
¹ µ
µdµ ¡ N[^ µ ¡ ¹ µ]wI + N[^ µ ¡ ¹ µ]v(G);
while the N(1 ¡ ^ µ) of those who start a ¯rm in the formal sector collectively receive
N
Z 1
^ µ
µdµ + N[1 ¡ ^ µ][wL + t] + N[1 ¡ ^ µ]v(G):
Summing up the above expressions, total welfare for all entrepreneurs is given by:
­E = N
"Z 1
¹ µ
µdµ ¡
Z ^ µ
¹ µ
[eµS + wI]dµ ¡ [1 ¡ ^ µ][wL + t] + v(G)
#
:
The ML domestics workers in the formal sector collectively receive
ML (wL + v(G));
while the MI + U workers in the informal sector collectively receive
(MI + U)(wI + v(G)):
Total welfare for all workers with weight ® 2 [0;1] on the welfare of undocumented
workers is given by:
­W = MLwL + (MI + ®U)wI + (M + ®U)v(G):
30Summing up ­E and ­W, and using the labour market clearing conditions (6) and
(7), and the expression for the informal wage given by (8), total weighted welfare is:
­(t;e;G;®) = N
Z 1
¹ µ
µdµ + [N ¡ M ¡ U]k ¡ N
Z 1
^ µ
tdµ ¡ N
Z ^ µ
¹ µ
eµSdµ
¡ (1 ¡ ®)U [[1 ¡ eS](1 ¡ m ¡ u) ¡ k] + [M + N + ®U]v(G):
Proof of Proposition 1
We proceed to two steps. First, we show that the constraint given by (11) is optimally
binding. Second, we show that wages will be equalized across sectors.
Step 1. Rewriting (13), we have
± = [M + N + ®U]v
0(G)c + SN
Z 1¡m
1¡m¡u
µdµ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)US(1 ¡ m ¡ u): (34)
Given our assumption on v, the multiplier ± will be positive and the constraint will
bind provided the sum of the last two terms on the right-hand side of (34) is positive.
We now show that this is the case.
SN
Z 1¡m
1¡m¡u
µdµ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)US(1 ¡ m ¡ u) = SN
µ
u2
2
+ ®u(1 ¡ m ¡ u)
¶
> 0;
Step 2. Given the constraint is optimally binding, we have t¤ = (1 ¡ m)Se¤. Substi-
tuting this condition into the expression for the wage in the formal sector given by
(10), the resulting expression together with (8) yields Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
In a segmented equilibrium, optimal public good provision is determined by
[N+M+®U]v
0(G
¤) =
2
4
1 + 1
M(1¡m)
³
N
R 1¡m
1¡m¡u µdµ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)U(1 ¡ m ¡ u)
´
1 ¡ 1
M(1¡m)
c
S
3
5: (35)
a) In the text.
b) An increase in c increases the right-hand side of (35) and therefore, v0(G¤) must
go up. Since v
00 < 0, this means G¤ must go down
31c) When ® = 0, U only appears on the right-hand side of (35). Di®erentiating the
right-hand side with respect to U with ® = 0, we obtain
S
(M(1 ¡ m)S ¡ c)
u > 0:
Therefore, with ® = 0 an increase in U increases v0(G¤) and since v
00 < 0, G¤ must
go down.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let
F(e;c) = [N+M+®U]v
0(G
¤)¡
2
4
1 + 1
M(1¡m)
³
N
R 1¡m
1¡m¡u µdµ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)U(1 ¡ m ¡ u)
´
1 ¡ 1
M(1¡m)
c
S
3
5
where G¤ = [M(1 ¡ m)S ¡ c]e¤.
a) It follows from (35) that the condition F(e;c) = 0 yields equilibrium enforcement
e¤ as a function of c. Totally di®erentiating F, we obtain
de¤
dc
= ¡
Fc
Fe
where
Fe = [N + M + ®U]v
00(G)(M(1 ¡ m)S ¡ c) < 0;
Fc = ¡[N + M + ®U]v
0(G)
1
M(1 ¡ m)S ¡ c
·
1 +
v00(G)
v0(G)
G
¸
Therefore, optimal enforcement is increasing in c if v00(G)G=v0(G) < ¡1, decreasing
in c if v00(G)G=v0(G) > ¡1 and independent of c if v00(G)G=v0(G) = ¡1.
b) From Proposition 2c, dG¤=dU < 0 when ® = 0. Since G¤ = [M(1 ¡ m)S ¡ c]e¤,
optimal enforcement is also decreasing in U when ® = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let
R(^ µ;c;®;U) = ^ µ
2S
2
¡ (1 ¡ ^ µ)
c
N
+
S
2
¹ µ
2 + (1 ¡ 2^ µ)(1 ¡ ®)uS¹ µ ¡ S^ µ¹ µ
2:
32Eliminating v0(G) from the ¯rst-order conditions (20) and (21), and substituting in
the expressions from (18) yields
(1 ¡ 2^ µ)
^ µ2S ¡ c=N
=
(1 ¡ ^ µ)
S
2(^ µ2 ¡ ¹ µ2) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)uS(1 ¡ m ¡ u)
: (36)
Manipulating (36), we obtain
R(^ µ;c;®;U) = 0
which yields the equilibrium value of ^ µ¤ as a function of the marginal cost of enforce-
ment, the welfare weight on the undocumented workers and the number of undocu-
mented workers.
Totally di®erentiating R, we obtain
d^ µ¤
dc
= ¡
Rc
R^ µ
;
d^ µ¤
d®
= ¡
R®
R^ µ
;
d^ µ¤
dU
= ¡
RU
R^ µ
:
where
Rc = ¡
1 ¡ ^ µ
N
< 0
R® = ¡(1 ¡ 2^ µ)uS¹ µ < 0
RU =
(1 ¡ 2^ µ)(1 ¡ ®)S¹ µ
N
+
³
S¹ µ(1 ¡ 2^ µ) + (1 ¡ 2^ µ)(1 ¡ ®)uS
´ ¡1
N
= ¡
(1 ¡ 2^ µ)S
N
¡
®¹ µ + (1 ¡ ®)u
¢
< 0
R^ µ = ^ µS +
c
N
¡ 2(1 ¡ ®)uS¹ µ ¡ S¹ µ
2
=
c
N
+ S
h
^ µ ¡ (1 ¡ m + u ¡ 2®u)¹ µ
i
In equilibrium, ^ µ > ¹ µ. Therefore, if (1 ¡ m + u ¡ 2®u) < 1 then R^ µ will be positive
for all ®. Note that (1 ¡ m + u ¡ 2®u) is monotonically decreasing in ® and at
® = 0 the expression is (1 ¡ m + u) < 1 since m > u. Therefore, for all ® we have
(1 ¡ m + u ¡ 2®u) < 1 and R^ µ > 0.
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